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Development and Security: Origins and Future

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The problems of development and security have historically formed distinct discourses. More recently, they have been inextricably linked both in discourse and in much policy, thus creating the so-called development–security nexus that pervades much of today's international development assistance. The empirical basis for attention to this nexus has been quite obvious given the many humanitarian emergencies occurring in the 1990s. It is less clear what, in terms of linkages, went before and what will come after. This article discusses the putative nexus in different historical geopolitical contexts, probing into its origins and speculating about the shape it may take in the future. It consists of three parts. The first deals with conceptual issues and the overall theoretical framework. The second describes four historical discourses, consecutively prevalent from about 1750 to 1980. The third concerns the current discourse on globalization and its possible future shape: global development.

Keywords development · security · humanitarian intervention · transformation · global governance · global development

Introduction

OVER TIME, THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT has been increasingly linked to the concept of security, both in discourse and in explicit policy, thus creating the elusive development–security nexus that is the focus of this special issue of *Security Dialogue*. While it is true that the empirical basis for attention to 'the nexus' has been quite obvious and generally acknowledged in the light of the many humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, it is less clear from what past understanding this association arose, or what future awaits it in terms of linkages between the two theoretical concepts and the policy processes carried out in their name. This article discusses the putative development–security nexus in its successive historical geopolitical contexts, sketching a broad picture of the ways in which development has

SECURITY
DIALOGUE

been conceived in relation to notions of security in different periods in modern Western history. On this basis, it concludes with a discussion of possible scenarios for the future association of development and security.

Through much of the history of the two concepts, there has been no explicit discussion of a nexus, but rather separate discourses about either development or security in which the interrelationship of the concepts and practices inhered. This article therefore approaches the question of how the development–security nexus has taken shape historically (in Europe) through a focus on trends in dominant approaches to development thinking in the works of major social science thinkers (Western and male) who defined the development problem of the time.[1] More specifically, it explores the ways in which 'development' rationales are informed by perceived 'security arrangements'. In so doing, the article offers an overarching account of large historical periods in order to outline the dominant logics that have given meaning to different notions of the de facto and desirable connection between development and security: 'the nexus'.[2] Such an overview provides a backdrop both for understanding possible future linkages and for speculations about desirable future scenarios.

The article consists of three parts. The *first* deals with conceptual issues and the overall methodological framework through which the historical accounts in the subsequent section take form. This framework is based on a macro-historical approach to the analysis of change, inspired by Polanyi's ([1944] 2001) depiction of economic-historical dialectics. In this approach, there is a tension between market and interventionist solutions, creating 'development' and 'security' in various forms and combinations.

The *second* part describes the dominant trends in thinking about development during four distinct historical periods from about 1750 to 1980. The first period, which I portray as 'The Birth of Liberal Peace', can be seen as characterized by a focus on progress and the importance of different kinds of freedoms. It emerged in the context of a power struggle among states in 18th-century Europe. This turbulence notwithstanding, the idea of liberal peace as rooted in a commercial society took shape. This optimistic line of thought, linking trade, freedom, democracy and peace, continues the tradition from what is generally referred to as the Enlightenment to the thinking of the father of neoliberalism, Friedrich Hayek, who was famous for linking economic planning with serfdom and war (see Hayek, 1944). In the second era, portrayed here as a time of 'Industrialization and National Security', beginning in 1815, the concern for development focused on the perceived state security-related need for industrialization, forming the first explicit development–security discourse. Order rather than freedom was prioritized. The

[1] This section draws largely on Hettne (2009).
[2] European colonial history does not figure centrally in these accounts, not because of its lack of importance but because the accounts are intended to reflect the way history was narrated in the dominant logics of Western European development thinking.

period 1914–45, 'Dark Times and Interventionism', was marked by war and depression, constituting a deep crisis for the liberal project and giving birth to the Cold War. However, after World War II, the modernization paradigm was rapidly restored. In this new geopolitical context, portrayed here as 'The Geopolitics of Poverty', the question of development became part of the Cold War – acted out in a deeply realist security order – which essentially was a competition between two superpowers and two rivalling socio-economic systems. In all these eras, the 'nexus' takes on different shapes and meaning. The narrative starts in Europe and moves into a European world system, ending up in a globalized world order where a 'global south' exists everywhere alongside a 'global north'.

The *third* part concerns the current discourse on globalization and its possible future shape. This analysis is consequently more scenario-oriented. From 1980 onwards, developmentalist ideas were replaced by the discourse and logic of 'globalism', resulting in worldwide social dislocations. This has led to a call for a new paradigm, 'global development', defined here as an improvement in the quality of international relations towards a global world order and ultimately global sustainable security.

Approaching the 'Nexus'

Development and security, as noted elsewhere in this issue by Stern & Öjendal (2010), are essentially contested concepts and can only be defined in general terms. Furthermore, as will be illustrated below, the meanings attributed to them change over time. In the most general sense, 'development' is a way to conceptualize those aspects of pervasive, continuous social change to which human actors attribute particular meaning and value, and that in some sense, and to a varying extent, are believed to be possible to influence. 'Development' is typically definable only in a particular context, making it subject to change over time and geography (see Hettne, 1995).

In this article, 'security' is understood as a reasonable level of predictability at different levels of the social system, from local communities to the global level, or the world order. Security in this general sense is the opposite of 'durable disorder' (Cerny, 1998). Nonetheless, the question of 'whose security' it is that is to be secured remains a site of contestation. The conventional realist view of security emanates from the position of the individual nation-state in an anarchic international system and basically concerns the survival of the state as such, that is to say, the preservation of its sovereignty. Today, security problems refer to more than military threats (Dannreuther, 2007).[3] Indeed, threats to security can come from widely different sources: foreign

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[3] See Fierke (2007) for a good overview of different notions of security.

states, own governments, tsunamis and even next-door neighbours (see the article by Orjuela, elsewhere in this issue). The UNDP's *Human Development Report 1994* offers clear evidence of this shift in the world of policy, insofar as it raised the question of human security and expressed a stark contrast between the people's and the state's need for security. In later reports, the concept of human security was linked to 'human development', and ultimately to the whole complex of human rights. One can see this focus on 'human' as part of a paradigm shift, giving rise to a post-national logic. The frequent use of the concept 'human' in different constellations suggests a transnational assumption of responsibility, as if one could no longer rely on states to fulfil their duties for their citizens. As we will see below, this shift figures centrally in the current call for 'global development'.

There are several ways of linking development and security: policy-wise, empirically, theoretically and discursively. The policy links are particularly clear in the pattern of development aid. Because the many connections between security and development have become increasingly visible owing to the global attention to humanitarian emergencies (Keen, 2008), a policy convergence between, for instance, development and conflict management has become prominent. Indeed, in current policy, the 'inextricable links' between security and development are repeated like a mantra, and encompass vast arrays of problems and policy goals (see contributions in this issue). These policy claims draw upon increasingly evident empirical links between security and development specific to particular situations (Stewart, n.d.). It cannot be denied, for instance, that violent conflict carries heavy development costs. Development may also, at least indirectly, contribute to the prevention or 'provention' of conflict. 'Provention' (which is severely undertheorized) combines the promotion of conditions conducive to peace and the prevention of conditions conducive to violence. The idea is to try to avoid the emergence of conflict by dealing with structural root causes (Burton, 1990). It should thus be an obvious task for theory to clarify more deeply in what ways development and security can be (causally) related and how the two may influence each other.

As noted above, the theoretical perspective chosen here is the economic-historical dialectic between the market and political interventions to control and steer the economy. In the following section, I examine how the security–development nexus has taken shape in differing historical periods through this theoretical prism. First, however, let us review the lens through which we see this process.

In the theory of economic history associated with Karl Polanyi ([1944] 2001), an expansion and deepening of the market is accompanied by political intervention in 'defence of society'. This approach means that all social situations are structured by previous historical developments, at the same time as they contain the ingredients for future change (Cox, 1996).

This holistic-historicist perspective is perhaps best illustrated in Polanyi's identification of the 'great transformation', where the 'double movement' – read here as the dynamics of development, triggering altered security thinking – allows us to explore historical periods, as well as to enquire into current changes in notions of the 'nexus' through this theoretical lens. In the process, a second great transformation and attendant counter-movements can be identified, from which new forms of security–development 'nexuses' emerge.

Hence, the expansion/deepening of the market constitutes the *first movement,* which altered the basics for the previous development and security rationale and was followed by a *second movement.* Together, these constitute what Polanyi famously termed a 'double movement'. The 'second movement' contains all kinds of counter-movements caused by the dislocations and disorder associated with market penetration into new areas and new sectors. Society defends itself against the market, but the way in which this defence is organized is ultimately through political intervention, the aim being to achieve (a certain interpretation of) stability, predictability and order. According to Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 137), 'the countermovement consisted in checking the action of the market in respect of the factors of production, labour and land. This was the main function of intervention'. This can lead to 'great compromises', in which the dialectics of market expansion and political intervention are contained, at least for some time, in a stable equilibrium. Such a compromise should include both a security arrangement and a development strategy if it is to be sustainable. Or, in other words, *the chosen development strategy relies upon (the perception of) a particular and necessary security 'arrangement' – usually, as we shall see below, between states – as a given backdrop.*

Hence, the Great Transformation covered the period from the mid-19th century to the 1930s, with the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 laying the ground for a great compromise. This was facilitated by an emerging Cold War hegemonically defining the content of security. As will be discussed in the final section of this article, the current period can be seen as a 'second great transformation', paving way for a new great compromise through various counter-movements and attempts at political reregulation. In these 'transformations', the intermingling of security and development, as well as what has been pursued in their name, is deeply entrenched. However, this time, development is contested and multidimensional, and the defining of security is a far more complex endeavour.

Development and Security in History

The current world order, often called 'Westphalia' after the 1648 peace treaty, took shape at a time when one political order was dying, while a new one

was nascent. The Westphalian order was based on the sovereign state, which in turn implied the end of local power-centres, as well as of imperial political and economic structures. The carving out of political territories was violent, and people therefore learned to think of their 'own' state as protector, and the rest of the world as 'anarchy'. The regional states system was 'globalized' as the states carried their struggles to other parts of the world, creating a European world system and ultimately a 'Third World' (see Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). Throughout this modern history, there have been repeated efforts to create geopolitical hegemony, provoking 'anti-hegemonic' wars and 'internal' conflicts that spill over geopolitical borders yet nonetheless reproduce Westphalian logic.

We now turn to explore this history in the light of the changing interrelationships between development rationales and security orders.

The Birth of Liberal Peace

A century after the peace of Westphalia, the political and military order remained unsettled. The pattern of conflict differed before and after the French Revolution, a formative event for most of Europe. Before the Revolution, politics was a tangle of premodern dynastic relations, balance-of-power wars, and competing territorial claims both inside and outside Europe. Inside Europe, an unstable regional order took form. Outside, the struggle was largely an affair between Great Britain and France. The ultimate victory of the former laid the foundation for its commercial success, as well as its early industrial development, slowly affecting large parts of the continent.

Dominant 18th-century development thinking concerned the causes and meanings of Progress, originally identified with Providence, immanent in history and therefore not of human design. Subsequently, Progress was secularized and conceived as being possible for human agency to influence. This philosophical 'great leap' constituted the main feature of this new discourse. The key development issue was freedom from economic and political control. Both Adam Smith and the French physiocrats asserted that development always will find its way, but knowledge about the 'laws' of the economic system was nevertheless essential in avoiding harmful interference. Mercantilism, a doctrine of state-building explicitly arguing in terms of state security and power, in the liberal view, represented such a harmful influence. The economy should be left to its own 'laws'.

Physiocratism and early liberalism suggested somewhat different paths to 'the wealth of nations', but could nevertheless be seen as forming part of the same discourse about the preferred economic order, which also was seen as a peace order. In this sense, understandings of the conditions for security (as envisioned then) were part and parcel of those for economic prosperity (or 'development'); the 'nexus' conceived as connections between two distinct

concepts/practices might then have been considered invisible, as security and development emerged in sync, as mutually supportive. For instance, Anne Robert Turgot was concerned with the violence around him but believed that, as all parts of the world were connected through commerce, manners become gentler and the human mind more enlightened (Nisbet, 1980).

Perhaps most importantly, Immanuel Kant's cosmopolitan approach to a future perpetual (or eternal) peace was ethical but also constitutional (republican) (Fischer, 2000). Its realization would only be possible in a universal civil society founded on justice. Freedom and reason would make this possible, but it was in Kant's view a long-term prospect in which 'savages' and 'barbarians' ultimately became civilized. Thus, disturbingly, peace presupposed increased sameness and decreased difference. Other less long-term theories linked material 'interests', in contrast to 'passions' (associated with feudalism), with peacefulness. Such logic enabled an early 'security argument' for capitalism (Hirschman, 1977). According to this line of thinking, security was premised on the accumulation of economic resources.

After the French Revolution, the conflict pattern changed as new social and political forces were released. France, empowered through a mobilized patriotic people, became strong enough to threaten the rest of the continent, particularly after Napoleon's rise to power. The latter's ambition was to create a new kind of European empire based on the modern values and institutions of what is generally termed the Enlightenment. Progress was thus forced upon Europe through empire, which challenged the anarchic principles of Westphalia and resulted in a war for restoring the balance of power, which ended this rather chaotic period. This paved the way for a completely different security arrangement after 1815, and also a more explicit conservative and nationalist link between development and security (Hettne, 2009). Up to and including the Napoleonic Wars, progress (development) was of a dynamically changing quality, whereas order (security) required a form to contain this – as it were – unstoppable force. Hence, in this period, the dominant approach to security–development involved an inherent mismatch. The 'nexus' then was one of disaccord, where the sheer force of progress triggered new security arrangements.

Industrialization and National Security

If 'freedom' had been the key political value in the 18th century, 'order' became even more important in the 19th century, creating what seemed to be a 'nexus' in balance. The European system was stabilized by the European Concert: a concerted action by 'great powers'. The 'anarchy' among states thereby became a somewhat more institutionalized and predictable 'anarchical society' (Bull, 1977). The period, marked by strictly controlled territorial and social stability, coincided with the first phase of what Polanyi calls the

Great Transformation. His holistic description of this era is worth citing at length:

> Nineteenth century civilization rested on four institutions. The first was the balance-of-power system which for a century prevented the occurrence of any long and devastating war between the Great Powers. The second was the international gold standard which symbolized a unique organization of the world economy. The third was the self-regulating market which produced an unheard-of material welfare. The fourth was the liberal state. Classified in one way two of these institutions were economic, two political. Classified in another way, two of them were national, two international. Between them they determined the characteristic outlines of the history of our civilization (Polanyi, [1944] 2001: 3).

The European Concert stimulated both national and international market expansion, as well as more widespread industrialization. This 'long peace' was the high tide of modernity. The state took a leading role in the most common development strategy, called 'state capitalism' (Hettne, 1995). The dominant 19th-century notion of the necessary connections between state military security and development thus contained a high degree of state intervention.

The 'development problem' was seen to be shaped by the fierce economic and military rivalry among territorial states, defining the overarching development problem: the industrialization imperative. This development rationale was concerned with the problem of uneven development and 'backwardness' among states, along with the resultant security implications for states. 'Catching up' was a typical expression of the imperative, the metaphor being some sort of 'race', even a deadly race, since the losers might also lose their statehood. Development in this situation implied a strengthening of the material base of the state through industrialization, a process remarkably similar from one country to another and reinforced by the security interests of the ruling elite (Sen, 1984). The neomercantilist security logic had been expressed already by Alexander Hamilton in the newly independent United States of America: 'Not only wealth but the independence and security of a country appear to be materially connected to the prosperity of manufactures' (cited in Carr, 1984: 122). The German economist Friedrich List echoed these words 50 years later: 'on the development of the German protective system depend the existence, the independence and the future of the German nationality' (cited in Carr, 1984: 122).

The development of capitalism was accompanied by its expansion outside Europe, a process that reached its most intensive phase from the closing stage of the century and until the start of World War I. Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 15) pointed out that peace had been maintained with the help of international finance (*haute finance*). Financial interests may occasionally benefit from limited wars, but most importantly they had been instrumental in preventing general war among the great powers. The resulting lesson was that 'balance of power' could not by itself ensure peace.

It has more recently been suggested that the global financial elites, in conformity with liberal peace theory, may share an interest in some kind of reregulation in the interest of systemic stability (Helleiner, 2000). Regulation can be of different kinds and is not necessarily anti-market. It is relevant to recall what Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 139) said about marketization: 'There was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course'. In his world, then, wealth was connected to politics; or, in current terminology, development was inevitably connected to state-defined security. In hindsight, the development–security nexus, in its particular and mutually reinforcing 19th-century form, was a prerequisite that underpinned the dynamism of this historical era.

'Dark Times' and Interventionism

The 19th century was Europe's Grand Era. At the close of the century, 'stability' came to an end and peace, understood as 'absence of war', once again became synonymous with balance of power. This was the end of what Polanyi called '19th-century civilization'. A return to this bygone civilization was impossible, although efforts to restore the liberal order were made once World War I (essentially a 19th-century phenomenon) was over. The League of Nations, meant to reconstitute the European Concert in a more institutionalized form, became a complete failure as the 'revisionist' states (Germany, Italy and Japan) challenged the dominance of the prosperous liberal states (Carr, 1984). As the would-be concert failed, realism became the dominant security paradigm, mismatching the idea of liberal peace, which thence lost credibility, setting the scene for the coming disaster. 1929 was the great divide, when 'the nexus' as it was conceived and translated into policy efforts failed to produce mutually supportive mechanisms (which Polanyi correctly saw as essential). Chauvinistic nationalism, order based on realism, rising trade barriers and contracting economies were all in contradiction to liberal internationalism – and worse was yet to come.

War and depression characterized much of this period, often referred to as the 'dark times' (as a contrast to 'enlightened times'). Germany and the Soviet Union were organized as war economies. In Germany, the economic system was planned for the purpose of foreign aggression. In the Soviet Union, the original purpose was more defensive. During the October Revolution in 1917, Lenin had said, 'Either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries'. In the early 1930s, Stalin echoed, 'We are fifty or hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us'.[4] This was the industrialization imperative as it appeared to the Russian revolutionaries. Here, development and security (in their time-specific configurations) had switched places:

[4] Both quotes taken from Holloway (1981: 9).

whereas previously order and predictability enabled development, in this period wealth served to help reinstate order through the politics of war. This was obviously a 'nexus' in disaccord, and hence not sustainable.

Between the two world wars of unprecedented destructiveness, there was a deep economic and social crisis, further undermining the liberal hegemony and opening the doors to extreme interventionist ideologies. The new practice of planning predominated even in liberal democracy in the form of Keynesianism. John Maynard Keynes was throughout the period active as an international diplomat in various efforts to solve international financial problems, which exemplify the link between development and security. He had warned that implementation of the treaty of Versailles would undermine the economic recovery of Europe by destroying the foundations of the German economy. A decade later, the whole of Europe plunged into economic crisis as the capitalist machinery came to a halt. Attempts to intervene in the trade system through devaluations, export promotion and import control spread the disease and worsened the situation, making a (Polanyian) great compromise necessary.

The crisis in capitalist development provoked a 'second movement', manifested in different anti-liberal ideological shapes such as fascism, Nazism and communism. According to Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 248), who had first-hand experience from varieties of anti-liberal politics during his youth in Hungary, 'fascism, like socialism, was rooted in a market society that refused to function': both overemphasized 'politics' (read: security through order) on behalf of development. This created a nexus in which economic development was either for aggression and territorial conquest or for defence. The 'nexus' had failed to create a peaceful and progressive international system.

Geopolitics of Poverty

After World War II, modernization optimism paradoxically returned. Economic planning for reconstruction consolidated the nation-state in Europe soon to become the European Economic Community, hailed as a 'security community'. The connections between security and development were explicit and obvious, and the policies enacted in their name were exceptionally efficient in the immediate post-World War II period. On the economic front, conflicts were avoided through what Ruggie (1998: 72) has termed 'embedded liberalism' with reference to the Bretton Woods system. This arrangement was, according to Polanyi, a *great compromise*, a political deal that defined the mode of governance in terms of market-state relations. This compromise between national regulation and international free trade paved the way for the 'golden years', the 1950s and the 1960s. But, it is also obvious how development ambitions and security perceptions started to multiply and differ from each other, as well as from previous epochs.

The postwar development discourse concerned 'underdevelopment' as a threat to the new world order ('the free world') in the context of an emerging Cold War: the geopolitics of poverty. Development was linked to altogether different security concerns: a struggle between the superpowers and at the same time a worldwide competition between two different socio-economic systems. The structure of bipolarity created cleavages in all regions of the world, and the Cold War shaped all major conflicts. The anti-systemic guerrilla struggle labelled 'communist insurgency' by the West was the typical war during this period, particularly in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. But, there were also interstate tensions, for instance in East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. Here we find more conventional rivalries and wars that can be related to balance-of-power politics, regional security complexes, reminiscent of the 19th-century European states system.

Socialism as a new form of modernity was still an attractive model for many developing countries, further encouraged by Soviet financial and political support. The new state security strategy (balance of terror) that dominated in Cold War Europe guaranteed a fairly high degree of predictability. Both superpowers defined security in terms of bloc stability, which drastically limited the practical sovereignty of individual states, particularly the recently decolonized poor world. These countries responded with their – in the rich world little appreciated – Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and, subsequently, equally futile demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

The structural conflict (North–South) led to the rise of the 'dependency' paradigm, first emerging in Latin America and reflecting the subordinate economic position of the non-European areas in the world system as well as the limited political sovereignty implied in bipolar domination (Hettne, 1995). The conclusion drawn by dependency theorists was that real development implied self-reliance and even delinking from the capitalist system. To the extent that this strategy was implemented, it led to external and internal conflict. The implementation of self-reliance projects in the Third World – radical ones like Maoism and the rural utopia of the Khmer Rouges in Cambodia, as well as more moderate ones like Nyerere's Ujamaa villages – failed miserably and was normally connected with violence. In this period, security and development and their interrelations became more explicitly contested terrain; competing interpretations arguably multiplied and proliferated over time. Hence, the 'nexus' appeared as increasingly complex and multidimensional.

Towards Global Development and Sustainable Security?

The current period can be seen as a 'second great transformation', with global-ization establishing a market on a global scale and the counter-movements searching for alternatives (Gills, 2000). These also include a variety of popu-list movements, some of them raising disturbing themes from the 1930s, a warning that counter-movements are not necessarily what we usually call progressive.

   This section of the article questions whether a more interventionist develop-ment thinking is on its way back after three decades dominated by *globalism,* the ideology of market-led globalization as the only path to global welfare. The fledgling move towards 'global development' promises its ultimate merg-ing with global sustainable security. The reasons for such discursive change can be found, for instance, in the financial crisis erupting during the autumn of 2008, as well as mounting ecological problems, above all climate change.

Globalization and Disorder

The shift to a development discourse centred on globalization took up momentum in the 1980s. Globalism became the new paradigm, occasionally replacing the idea of development with the strategic imperative of structural adjustment. The development theories and strategies associated with politi-cal interventionism had been more or less unsuccessful, except in the cases of a handful of 'developmental states' in East and Southeast Asia, supported by the West for geopolitical reasons. Other countries indulged in overspend-ing, which soon led them into financial troubles and thereby to disciplinary economic and political conditionalities, making them liberalize and open up their economies. This was soon to be the general recipe in the world economy. As the Cold War ended, the discourse on engineered development dimin-ished. A non-interventionist approach became predominant, now pressing for a more consistent liberal policy: the Washington Consensus. The domestic bases for continued globalization were created. This was the era of liberal triumphalism, most clearly expressed in the controversial 'end of history' thesis (Fukuyama, 1989).

   In the development literature, there was now only one economic theo-ry: neoliberalism. This discursive change was pursued by the 'counter-revolutionaries', a group of economists who from the very beginning had been sceptical to Keynesian theory and saw development theory, particularly dependency, as a leftist ideology without scientific basis (Toye, 1987). The causes of disorder and development failures were interpreted as internal. This counter-revolution was partly ideology (New Right), partly a resurgence of a new realism. It is undeniable that many politicians and 'rent-seeking' bureaucrats were enriching themselves rather than developing their coun-

tries, thereby becoming 'development obstacles'. This reminds us of the early liberal critique of mercantilism.

In its ideological core, globalism relied on the growth of a world market that increasingly penetrates and dominates 'national' economies. Since this process is synonymous with increased efficiency and a higher 'world product', globalists viewed 'too much government' as a systemic fault. Good governance was consequently defined as less government. According to the ideology of globalism, development meant freeing the market from various political and bureaucratic obstacles that had been established to regulate the economy. In reality, it implied, as Polanyi pointed out long ago, the installation of a new, market-friendly political framework serving above all capital accumulation and economic growth by playing down other considerations, for instance social justice. An element of coercion crept in in the form of neo-conservatism: liberal peace in authoritarian form (Fukuyama, 2006).

To link globalization and disorder as a causal relationship is controversial, since in so doing one seemingly blames the globalist development model for new security/order problems, such as collapsing states and domestic unrest, rather than seeing it as promoting welfare and peace, in line with liberal peace theory. However, by practising the ideology of globalism, the state in fact became the disciplining spokesman of external economic forces, rather than the protector of domestic society, which had been the historical task of nation-building. This retreat includes a tendency for the state to become alienated from civil society; its role as provider of security for its citizens consequently comes under question. Exclusion as well as inclusion is inherent in globalization, and benefits occurring somewhere are negatively balanced by misery and violence elsewhere. The exclusivist implications lead to 'politics of identity', as loyalties are transferred from civil society to 'primary groups' (defined as the smallest 'we-group' in a particular social context), and competitions for scarce resources in growing development crises ensue. This also implies a crisis for the nation-building project based on the principle of inclusion. Consequently, the sanctioned paths 'towards' security and development deviate and fragment.

The postmodern global condition is often described (and celebrated) by the key concept 'difference', which to a modernist may appear as 'disorder'. The old assumption of convergence and growing sameness implied in the modern project is increasingly questioned. The postmodern line of reasoning acknowledges the fact that globalization has undermined the nation-state order, but tries to identify some sort of logic in this seemingly turbulent situation, in which 'durable disorder' can go on for decades, thus no longer being abnormal. Rather, globalization ushers forth the birth of a new order, very different from modernist assumptions. Conventional thinking has it that disintegration of the state implies non-development, but some studies of 'real' substantive economies suggest a more complex picture of emerging 'local'

(or rather 'glocalized') economies, delinked from state control, run by a new type of entrepreneur, protected by private militias or simply mafia gangs, sometimes drawing on international connections (Reno, 1998). All this was possible since the state became unable to legally define and protect various assets and resources situated within the 'national' territory (Duffield, 1998). 'Collapsing' states led to 'new wars'.

Even if 'new wars' usually are defined as 'internal', the 'new' situation is actually characterized by the erosion of the external–internal distinction. As a state is dissolved, it can no longer be territorially defined, and occasionally neighbouring states are drawn into clashes among themselves (the regionalization of conflict). The phenomenon, as noted above, may be not only a simple passing crisis for the state, but a 'durable disorder'. This can be described as some sort of regression into pre-Westphalianism – or medievalism – a world with a drastically reduced role for the nation-state as we know it. The overall significance of this route is a downward movement of authority to subnational regions, localities and social groups, while supranational forms of governance remain embryonic. In terms of 'development', 'durable disorder' implies a generalized warlord economy with limited influence of external forms of authority on the local power-holders and social forces, delivering security of sorts, but distinctly different from its classic conception.

As a result of the spread of disorder that many have talked about as 'global civil war', there emerged during the 1990s a qualitatively new discourse on intervention called 'humanitarian intervention' (by others 'military humanism', 'liberal imperialism' or 'humanitarian imperialism'), which implied a coercive involvement by external powers in a domestic crisis with the purpose of preventing anarchy, punishing human rights abuses, and promoting democracy and 'good governance'. The murky concept of 'failed states' became prominent (Call, 2008). Governance and nation-building entered the development discourse now more explicitly linked to security. This justification of external interventions can be seen as an extension of international development assistance into a more coercive form, challenging established principles of territorial sovereignty.

Development became securitized, and 'the nexus' was taking form. The 'nexus', in these discourses, typically refers to mutually constitutive goals and strategies to achieve them, although this time with the 'subject' increasingly being the human instead of the state. As noted above, implied in concepts such as 'human security', 'human development', 'humanitarian emergency' and 'humanitarian intervention' was the idea of a transnational responsibility for human welfare: the responsibility to protect. This is a major departure from the Westphalian logic as expressed in the UN Charter: 'Nothing in this

charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.[5]

Humanitarian intervention has been carried out in the name of humanity – powered by references to human rights – by militarily cooperating states, sometimes in a formal UN context, sometimes in a plurilateral form, sometimes complemented by various non-military forms through what somewhat prematurely is referred to as 'global civil society'. NGOs also received a new task and new role in global governance (Duffield, 2007). Apart from this, international courts dealing with crimes against humanity have been established, further undermining the Westphalian logic. A full-fledged human rights regime implies, de facto, a post-Westphalia (Falk, 2004) and a novel globalized security–development nexus. Development was, in collapsing states, reduced to what development workers had to do in situations of crisis and conflict. Development aid was reduced to a civil form of humanitarian intervention. However, the interventionist movement in its liberal form lost some momentum after 2001.

After 11 September 2001, a new world order pattern emerged, of which unipolarity, unilateralism and coercive dominance were the basic principles. The discourse changed from 'humanitarian intervention' to 'pre-emptive intervention' or 'war against terrorism', and the underlying ideology was neoconservatism rather than neoliberalism. The 'nexus' conceived this way emerges as counterinsurgency (see articles by Duffield and Jensen elsewhere in this issue).

As globalization includes and excludes, the alternative tradition in development theory can still be defined as incorporating demands from 'the excluded', but in the perception of 'post-development' it is not clear into what they are supposed to be included. An alternative development dimension in a context of societal disintegration is the role model of remaining 'islands of civility' in a sea of civil war (Kaldor, 1999). In the same spirit, post-conflict reconstruction was a new development experience of massive social engineering, completely different from the physical rebuilding of war-torn societies (for instance in post-World War II Europe), in which some societal coherence was still intact. A 'complex humanitarian emergency' includes not only physical destruction but social exclusion, depletion of 'social capital', erosion of civil society, decay of institutions and decline of civility. In view of the fact that the pre-conflict structure generated tensions that led to conflict, post-conflict 'reconstruction' is of course a most inappropriate term. It should rather mean the creation of something new in order to be sustainable, thus constituting the ultimate meeting point between development and security (see Öjendal & Lilja, 2009). The two could hardly be separated, as is captured in concepts

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[5] According to current international law, there are still only two legal types of intervention: (1) a conflict constitutes a threat to international peace, or (2) the behaviour of the parties to a conflict fundamentally violates human rights or humanitarian law (in the worst case a genocidal situation).

such as 'provention' and 'sustainable security'.[6]

Given the above historical overview, it is abundantly clear that the 'nexus' between development and security is anything but static or one-dimensional. There is consequently confusion and contestation over which values and actions could/should be pursued in their name. Furthermore, if we take as our point of departure that a second 'great transformation' is imminent, we can perhaps better understand the implications of the current global crisis. I therefore turn to a discussion of possible future scenarios.

What Governance for Global Development?

The current global crisis will surely influence the second great transformation briefly alluded to above, but it will probably take a long time to understand its full implications.[7] Lack of collective global leadership in the crisis-stricken world coincides with serious global challenges, such as the return of more traditional power politics, the threat of global recession, environmental stress, poverty, collapsing states and escalating refugee crises. Clearly, the seriousness of this issue requires a more effective system of global governance. Or, put differently, we need a new notion of the security–development nexus that is able to withstand the ongoing system change, while at the same time generating tools with which to address the challenges we are facing.

As we saw from the above historical overview, different world orders shape different patterns of global governance (be they a 'European Concert' or 'neoliberal globalization'), which take as their point of departure an account of necessary 'security arrangements'. For the purposes of imagining future world orders, Neo-Westphalian, pre-Westphalian or post-national scenarios emerge as the most readily available alternatives. What might such scenarios imply in terms of conceiving a 'new' 'nexus'?

The *neo-Westphalian* scenario would imply that the interstate system remains in its essential form, either through a reformed and strengthened UN or through a strongly security-oriented militarized structure. This structure could be unipolar, dominated by the USA, or multipolar, in the form of a Global Concert constituted by cooperating regional great powers, similar to the 19th-century European Concert, but this time including such emerging powers as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Such a structure would provoke regional liberation movements of different kinds, and would likely be a violent world, where development is likely to be subordinated to security (also resembling the 19th-century situation). The *pre-Westphalian*

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[6] Sustainable security introduces the notions of collective and human security and rebalances the three tools of foreign policy: defence, diplomacy and development; see Smith (2008).

[7] Compare what Polanyi ([1944] 2001: 20) said about the previous great crisis: 'The true nature of the international system under which we were living was not realized until it failed. Hardly anyone understood the political function of the international monetary system; the awful suddenness of its transformation thus took the world completely by surprise'.

scenario implies an erosion of the interstate system into a looser structure, sometimes called the 'New Middle Ages' or 'neomedievalism' (Cerny, 1998). This would tolerate a larger degree of freedom from control, but also very varying living conditions in different parts of the 'deglobalized' world. Violence would be widespread also here, but more low-scale compared to the first scenario; development may be cultivated in a 'localized' (or regionalized) version.

The *post-national* future (or 'global development'), finally, would mean a much stronger institutionalization of the supranational arena, to which much of the political power would flow, away from the state to the regional and the global level. This transnationalization of sovereignty would necessitate a high degree of legitimacy, based on global justice – in short, a global ethics for post-Westphalia. This scenario would be hard to achieve owing to the endurance of the more restricted international ethics embedded in Westphalian logics, but attractive for the simple reason that global problems are best dealt with on the global level, albeit supported by regional, national and local actors in what commonly is referred to as multilevel governance. To realize this scenario, the 'nexus' (as policy goal) would need to be permeated with notions of global justice and pursued under a shared ethics. We are again reminded of Kant's 19th-century vision. Let us nevertheless rest a few moments with this scenario, investigating some recent indications in support of a process heading this way.

The interregional option, promoted above all by the European Union, has become increasingly important for such a 'global development'. The interregional arrangements between the EU and other regions stress human rights, democracy and conflict prevention. Being an outflow of the new regionalism, these arrangements are (in principle) voluntary and fundamentally cooperative (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel, 1999/2000). Global development can be understood as an improvement in the quality of international relations, which traditionally have been described as 'anarchic'. The ultimate purpose of such a move towards policies adopting 'global development' as their frame of reference and goal would be to create a global community for all human beings.

Humanity does not yet, however, constitute a political community, much less a political actor. Global development would constitute a comprehensive policy arena, containing a number of issue areas: trade and economic cooperation, development cooperation, foreign and security policy with a focus on conflict management, and environmental policy, the state being a key – but not the only – actor, and with a distinctly different mandate and agenda.

The Millennium Declaration by the UN General Conference was a high mark in respect for international law and a loyalty declaration to the UN – and the principle of multilateralism. However, in terms of development, the goals did not go far beyond the basic-needs approach. A distinction should

therefore be made between quantitative improvements in terms of development indicators and qualitative structural change with redistributive implications. Justice, 'pragmatically integrated in global security' (Falk, 2004: 107), is by many political theorists seen as applicable on the national level only. A global ethics, if realized, will have to change this Westphalian legacy. Such a transformation of norms and practices takes a long-term, almost Kantian, perspective.

Global development necessitates an intercivilizational dialogue on the level of macro-cultures; such a dialogue would require a reasonably symmetric power-base for regional civilizations; instead of asymmetry and polarization, the structural gap between regions should be bridged, and the vertical structure of the world order horizontalized through the strengthening of weak and incoherent regions in the periphery. Global development, in structural rather than instrumental terms, implies a further strengthening of the societal (welfare) dimension of world order – the provision of global public goods through a more coherent transnational institutional structure.

What is the likelihood for such a scenario? Learning from history (read through a Polanyi-inspired macro-historical approach), we can see how the disrupting social consequences of deterritorialization, implied in the process of market-led globalization, generate counter-forces to halt and modify the process of globalization in order to guarantee territorial control, sustainable development, cultural diversity and human security. In the present context, the historical process of market expansion is a worldwide process, which is likely to make the social and political counter-movements hard to predict.

The pendulum seems to be moving towards the interventionist pole. Non-intervention would certainly have meant increasing chaos. Back to business-as-usual, in the event of a quick recovery, would mean a continuation of long-term insustainability, and thus new breakdowns, as economic growth fails to guarantee political stability and human security. The current crisis thus implies great risk, but also an opportunity to put human needs rather that greed in focus, rendering order/security the predominant global concern in the years to come. Certainly, a scenario like this would need a 'great nexus' to emerge, and the battle for the right to define this 'nexus' is, at the end of the day, what this article and issue is concerned with. At the current stage, it may be easier to define what such a nexus would not entail than what it should contain.

Summary and Conclusion

This article has probed into historical and future connections between development and security – the so-called nexus. The geopolitical context and the

(perceived) security order have generally impacted on development thinking and practice, albeit in different ways. The 'nexus' changed with the transformations of society. In sum, security-motivated state intervention has played a large role in European history, both in periods of industrialization and welfare and in periods of economic depression and war. The same can be said about the first decades of international development aid after 1945, which aimed at stabilizing the Third World, making it less threatening to Europe. More recently, the 'nexus' has been fully globalized.

As argued by Stern & Öjendal (elsewhere in this issue), there are many possible connections between development and security. The macro-historical account explored here took its point of departure in dominant development thinking during different historical periods in European history and explored the ways in which the perceived 'security arrangements' informed development logics and policies. As noted above, historically there was no explicit nexus spoken of, but rather separate discourses about either development (termed 'economics', 'progress', 'wealth') or security (termed 'peace', 'politics', 'predictability', 'order', 'stability'), in which the interrelationship of the concepts and practices inhered.

To recap: The 18th-century development discourse emerged in the context of a military power struggle among emerging states in a turbulent Europe, a struggle shaping the regional political order into a precarious state of balance of power. In spite of this violent context, the development discourse focused on the causes and meanings of 'progress', understood as immanent in history and often located in the far-off future. The economic doctrines at the time were primarily concerned about the formation of national wealth, but they linked this to state security, differing about what economic order best could promote these values. The liberal theory, identifying commercial society with peaceful society, turned out to be the predominant ideology for a long time to come, in spite of many setbacks. There have thus been many incarnations of this contested idea. Subsequently, progress was conceived as being possible for human agency (the state) to influence, thereby becoming 'development'.

The 19th-century era, which had a more stable security arrangement in the form of the European Concert, focused on the military need for industrialization. The 'development problem' was shaped by economic and military rivalry, and heavy industries were seen as a means to national strength and national security. For this, a strong interventionist state was needed. As the stable security order engineered by the European Concert broke down, the competition among states led to open violence and ultimately to the destructive European civil war. This period of economic depression and political extremism was a deep crisis for the modern project and the liberal order, which responded with total war. Politics (the quest for security/order) took full command over economics, and mainstream development was prompted for aggressive purposes.

After the victory over fascism, the optimistic modernization paradigm, now in the shape of liberalism as well as socialism, was restored. The development discourse was internationalized and now concerned poverty in the 'Third World' as a security threat to the 'free world'. As Duffield explains (in his contribution to this issue) underdevelopment was dangerous. 'Development' became part of the competition between the superpowers and their socio-economic systems.

During the 1980s and into the 1990s, development, in accordance with the Washington Consensus, became more or less synonymous with globalization. Developmentalist ideas were replaced by ultraliberal forms of modernization, expressed in the paradigm of 'globalism', ultimately resulting in worldwide social dislocations and interventionism. The 'nexus' now took more explicit shape. After increasing social turbulence, collapsing states and 'new wars' in the 1990s, it became clear that the global poverty problem would not be solved by the market, and the focus on the content of development again became more relevant. Order rather than justice became the predominant neoconservative concern after 2001. The financial meltdown played a crucial role for this discursive change, raising the new issues of global governance and global ethics.

The future world order, according to most observers, will be multipolar, but there is little consensus about whether it will be more peaceful or violent. Expressions such as 'post-American world', 'Pax Europaea', 'the rise of the rest', the 'second world' and the non-territorial 'Empire' all suggest a major transformation of the global power structure, but in what direction? What kind of power will result from the new geopolitics? There is a rather grim Orwellian scenario of hostile blocks, against which one can point to the possibility of regional multilateralism, or 'multiregionalism'. In such a (counter-)scenario, emerging regions would coexist in a normative universe of converging values, created through processes of intercivilizational dialogue.

Can the European experience of conflict resolution give a clue as to how global governance could achieve global development and sustainable security? Interregionalism as pursued by the EU, at least as a principle, could be seen as a way of institutionalizing the much-needed 'dialogue among civilizations'. Global development will therefore have to be pluralist in character. This precludes imposition of norms and values by threats and coercion. Cross-cultural values are nonetheless essential. Order has to be balanced by justice in order to prevent a deepening global conflict. For justice to become a core value requires a dramatic expansion of global consciousness, such as that expressed in the global justice movement initiated by the World Social Forum.

Global development can in its most general sense be understood as an improvement in the quality of international relations far beyond 'anarchical society' and, in its idealized version, already includes sustainable security.

So defined, it would mean that standards applied in most domestic systems, in accordance with welfare-state ideals, are increasingly taken as norms in the international system as well. The world-order crisis, sharpened by the current financial and economic chaos, underlines the need for a global social policy, leading to a restored development perspective beyond globalism. A fragmented social science cannot handle these complexities. To some extent, the 'nexus' is therefore an artificial problem, created by lack of interdisciplinarity. Will the 'nexus' stop being a nexus as the two concepts – development and security – merge in an emerging body of global social theory?

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